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Abstract :  
“Risk” has become a major theme in the social sciences over the past two decades. It has been 
argued to reshape social and political life not only by placing new issues on the agenda but also by 
generating new “governmental rationalities”. These debates have in various forms also began to 
influence international studies. It has already been shown that the introduction of risk has altered 
strategic rationality. An uncertain imagined future of Rumsfeldian “unknown unknowns” has 
become integral to military strategic thinking. In the process technologies used to wage war and the 
actors involved have also evolved. Continuing the discussion, this article moves on to look at the 
implications of these changes for legal and political boundaries in one specific area of international 
politics; it traces the link between the spread of risk rationality (or governance through risk) and the 
development of apolitical and unaccountable military markets. Risk rationality creates what I will 
tentatively term a preventive imperative that tends to spread across areas and is assisted in the 
process by the rapidly expanding ranks of risk professionals. The preventive imperative is key to the 
rapid growth of private military markets as well as to the difficulty of politicizing—in the sense of 
creating a critical public debate—about the market as opposed to about the a given scandal (e.g. 
Nisour Square incident) or firm (e.g. Blackwater). The difficulty of politicizing the market has 
strong implications for the (non-)working of accountability. It creates what I will dub an 
accountability paradox where the way accountability is pursued reinforces the impunity of markets 
and of specific market actors. The reason is that it pre-empts serious consideration of the 
public/private enmeshment which is the “blind spot” of present legal instruments and it positively 
reaffirms existing “regulation” in all its defectiveness. Neither security professionals nor lawyers 
are susceptible to resolve this paradox. Reference to the CIA “Killing Program” anchors and 
illustrates the argument.  
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Introduction 
 “Risk” has become a major theme in the social sciences over the past two decades. It has been 
argued to reshape social and political life not only by placing new issues on the agenda but also by 
generating new “governmental rationalities”. These debates have in various forms also influenced 
international studies, albeit to a lesser extent than one might have expected and certainly to a lesser 
extent than warranted.1 As pointed out by those who have drawn work on risk into international 
studies the implications are momentous in many fields (see editors’ introduction to this special 
issue). It has already been shown that the introduction of risk has altered strategic rationality. An 
uncertain imagined future of Rumsfeldian “unknown unknowns” has become integral to military 
strategic thinking.2 In the process technologies used to wage war and the actors involved have also 
evolved.3
 Risk rationality creates what I will tentatively term a preventive imperative
 Continuing the discussion, this article moves on to look at the implications of these 
changes for legal and political boundaries in one specific area of international politics; it traces the 
link between the spread of risk rationality (or governance through risk) and the development of 
apolitical and unaccountable military markets. 
4 that tends 
to spread across areas and is assisted in the process by the rapidly expanding ranks of risk 
professionals. The preventive imperative is key to the rapid growth of private military markets as 
well as to the difficulty of politicizing—in the sense of creating a critical public debate—about the 
market as opposed to about a given scandal (e.g. Nisour Square incident) or firm (e.g. Blackwater). 
The difficulty of politicizing the market has strong implications for the (non-)working of 
accountability. It creates what I will dub an accountability paradox where the way accountability is 
pursued reinforces the impunity of markets and of specific market actors. The reason is that it pre-
empts serious consideration of the public/private enmeshment which is the “blind spot”5
                                                 
1 A search of the Review of International Studies on articles with the word “risk” in the abstract gives a meager five hits. 
 of present 
legal instruments and it positively reaffirms existing “regulation” in all its defectiveness. Neither 
security professionals nor lawyers are susceptible to resolve this paradox. To anchor the claims, the 
article will draw on the CIA “Killing Program”. 
2 Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Rens Van Munster, 'Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest 
Editors' Introduction', Security Dialogue, 39 (2008), pp. 147-154. 
3 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty First Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
4 “Preventive” drawing on Bush and Rumsfled’s terminology (not Ewald’s which would be “precautionary”).  
5 The term is borrowed and inspired by the more general discussion in Gunther Teubner, 'In the Blind Spot: The 
Hybridization of Contracting', Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 8 (2006), pp. 51-72. 
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Apolitical Military Markets 
The CIA “Killing Program”—a name the media reportedly borrowed from agency insiders—was 
set up to arrest or kill targeted Al-Qaeda operatives wherever they were found. 6 It was launched in 
2001, briefly suspended in 2004 (in relation to an internal CIA review) and then resumed in a 
version including outsourcing parts of the program to the private security firm Blackwater (now 
Xe). In June 2009, Leon Panetta then director of the CIA, decided to discontinue the program and 
brief Congress which had been kept uninformed. The “Killing program” had cost $20 million over 
the eight years of its existence.7
 
 Panetta’s revelations sparked an intense public debate which 
touched many issues including the outsourcing of parts of the programme to Blackwater. This 
highly critical public debate may appear to belie the idea that risk driven governmental rationalities 
have contributed to the development of “apolitical” military markets. Yet, the CIA Killing Program 
nicely makes the point that military markets as opposed to individuals, companies or scandals are 
depoliticized by risk thinking.  
a. The preventive imperative of risk thinking 
The overarching reason risk thinking makes it difficult to politicize military markets is that it frames 
action in terms of an unknown future as essential. The resulting “imperative” to act is hard to 
question once risk thinking becomes (as it has become) central. If the necessary action then requires 
the reliance on markets and market actors which in view of the penchant to govern through markets 
it often does8
Risk thinking is geared towards the future and more specifically towards the need to take 
action to prevent some looming danger (the risk) from materializing. As has been discussed in 
considerable detail in the literature on risk, the kind of danger one is acting upon and how one 
, it becomes correspondingly difficult to create a public debate about this reliance. 
                                                 
6 The program is not unique but has parallels not only in other targeted assassination programs, including the Israeli 
targeted assassinations Oliver Kessler and Wouter Werner, 'Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management', Security 
Dialogue, 39 (2008), pp. 289-308. 
7 For discussions of the program see Rachel L. Swarns, 'Cheney Offers Sharp Defense of CIA Interrogation Tactics', 
New York Times, 31 August 2009; Mark Mazzetti, 'CIA Sought Blackwater's Help to Kill Jihadists', New York Times, 
20 August 2009; Joby Warrick and Jeffrey R. Smith, 'CIA Hired Firm for Assassin Program', Washington Post, 20 
August 2009; Mark Zanetti and Scott Shane, 'CIA had Plan to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders', New York times, 14 July 
2009; The Economist, 'CIA Interrogations and the Blackwater affair: Who should be held accountable for anti-
terrorism's dirtiest business?' The Economist, 27 August 2009; Der Spiegel, 'Blackwater accused of creating 'Killing 
Program'', Der Spiegel, 22 August 2009. 
8 This will not be discussed here but see e.g. Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Albrecht and Geneviève Schméder (eds.), 
Restructuring the Global Military Sector. The End of Military Fordism (London: Pinter, 1998) or Anna Leander, 
'Securing Sovereignty by Governing Security through Markets', in Rebbecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen (eds.) Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond (London: Palgrave, 
2009), pp. 151-170. 
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conceives of adequate action evolves in time and space. Different societies focus on different forms 
of risk and invent ways of preempting them, reflecting and reproducing political and institutional 
rationales of governance. This has been illustrated not only in Douglass anthropological work on 
how societies deal with risk but also for example in Hacking’s genealogy of risk or Ewald’s 
genealogy of insurance.9
Future orientation makes action taken on the basis of risk thinking difficult to contest and 
debate. The future cannot be known. But if a risk is immanent it would be irresponsible not to take 
the prudent, preventive and/or precautionary (using Ewald’s wording) measures necessary to protect 
oneself (and others) from it. It would also be irresponsible to critique those who were offering 
protection from the risk and taking the necessary measures. More than this, even with hindsight 
actions justified by risk scenarios are hard to contest. It is impossible to know whether or not the 
measures taken were the justified/adequate. The only sign of success is that nothing happens; the 
nonevent. However, the non-event may be drawn back to the fact that there was no risk rather than 
to successful action preventing risk, just as the event can be tracked back to the insufficiency of the 
preventive action, rather than to its mistaken nature. Since there can be no certain knowledge about 
what interpretation is right, the responsible strategy is to act on the risk. Critique of risk scenarios in 
other words strand on unknowables that come cloaked in the scientific and technical authority of 
risk managers/analysts. In combination with the responsibilization embedded in risk thinking, this 
poses serious obstacles to critical assessments of risk scenarios and the actions they invoke. Risk 
thinking creates something akin to an imperative to act on the future. 
 Variety and change is significant for a number of reasons but it does not 
alter that risk thinking leads to action directed towards preventing a specific future.  
This “preventive imperative” is central to the debate about the CIA Killing Program as well 
as to the process of outsourcing it. Cheney explained (and defended) the program and the decision 
to outsource parts of it with reference to the necessities created by the war on terror, underscoring 
that there was no need to inform Congress since the program formed part of a general policy that 
already had political backing.10
                                                 
9 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildawsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental 
Dangers (Berkely: University of California Press, 1982); Ian Hacking, 'Risk and Dirt', in Richard V. Ericson and Aaron 
Doyle (eds.) Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 22-48; Francois Ewald, 'The Return of 
Descartes' Malicious Demon: An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution', in Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon (eds.) 
Embracing Risk  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 273-301. 
 The risk scenario had been accepted, outsourcing to Blackwater was 
just the practical solution to the imperatives for action that followed. Along similar lines, CIA 
officials suggested that the program “was born partly out of desperation: the agency had tried to 
10 Quoted in Swarns, 'Cheney Offers Sharp Defense'. 
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operate the program in house and failed”11 and hiring Blackwater a matter of acting efficiently: 
“Blackwater’s successful track record in outsourcing made it logical to rely on it.”12 The 
assumption about the need for preventive actions inscribed in these statements is shared far beyond 
the defenders of the program. Even leading critics have found contesting it difficult. Senator Diane 
Feinstein (chairwoman of the Intelligence Committee13
 
) for example felt “ambivalent” about the 
critique of the CIA as well as about the judicial inquiry into the way the program has been handled. 
Overall, the preventive rationale—which is after all the key reason the CIA Killing Program was 
adopted—has filled a marginal space in the public debate.  
b. The Self-Sustaining Expansion of Risk 
If preventive imperative created by risk scenarios are singularly difficult to politicize once the risk 
scenarios are accepted, the question is why there is so little discussion about these scenarios in the 
first place. A key reason is the self-sustaining way risk technologies spread and frame new areas of 
thinking. New risks—and the techniques for analyzing and managing these—are imported as 
technical almost mechanical matters that do not seem to warrant much debate. This makes them 
pass largely unnoticed and makes them hard to question. The same goes for the markets that are 
created as part of these technologies. 
 The question of why risk thinking has become so dominant in our contemporary 
world—why risk seems to “spiral” and “colonize” ever new areas14— has attracted considerable 
scholarly attention. Many of the mechanisms and processes that have been uncovered in the search 
for an answer are self-sustaining. Two clusters of ideas have been particularly central. One is the 
idea that risk processes are reflexive and that this reflexivity drives an expansion of risks. This 
might be understood (as it is by e.g. Giddens and Beck) on a macro level where it is tied to the 
process of discovering ever new risks because of the scientific discoveries, the uncertainty about 
science and the risk inspired thinking dominating late (or reflexive) modernity. 15
                                                 
11 CIA official quoted in Mark Landler and Mark Mazzetti, 'US Still Using Security Firm it Broke with', New York 
Times, 22 August 2009. 
 But reflexivity 
can also be understood on a micro level as related to the processes by which action taken to prevent 
specific risks create new risks. This is pivotal for example in Power’s account of the growing 
12 Mazzetti, 'CIA Sought Blackwater's Help'. 
13Swarns, 'Cheney Offers Sharp Defense'. 
14 Henry Rothstein, Michael Huber and George Gaskell, 'A theory of risk colonization: The spiralling regulatory logics 
of societal and institutional risk', Economy and Society, 35 (2006), pp. 91 - 112. 
15 Ulrich Beck, 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash (eds.) Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 1-56. 
6 
 
centrality and ever increasing grip of “enterprise risk management” schemes in private companies. 
ERM is important not only for coordinating risk management across a company but also for 
ensuring that the risks that are created by taking action on risks are in turn integrated acted 
integrated into the risk management structure.16
The self-sustaining snowballing logic is even more explicit in the second cluster of ideas 
used to explain the spread of risk; namely explanations centered on risk technologies or 
assemblages. The logic here is that risk governance technologies tend to spread from one area to the 
next just because they exist. For some scholars this is an almost autonomous process. Haggerty and 
Ericsson compare it to the spread “rhizomatic” plants, i.e. plans that spread horizontally along the 
ground and set new vertical roots in the process that may (or may not) eventually be severed from 
the original plant.
 These “reflexive” processes capture a snowballing 
of risk logics from one sphere to the next. 
17 For others, the development of new risk technologies opens new possibilities 
and scope for action at risk that suggest to those involved the possibility of diffusing, adapting and 
transforming the risk technology to a new area. In Actor Network fashion risks technologies are 
“actants” in that they suggest actions and make them possible; they are “boundary objects” 
suggesting themselves for transport across areas. 18 This process is anchored—not in a critical 
reflection about risk selection—but in the logic of the risk technologies that act in ways that 
produce a snowballing of risk thinking. The consequence is a spread of risk logics to “everything” 
which may ultimately turn out to be “nothing” if the risks prove fictitious.19
This self-sustaining aspect of risk diffusion is important for understanding the diffusion of 
the military markets. The expansion of preventive imperatives that go with the spiraling of risk 
thinking accentuates overstretching and the need to resort to markets in all areas of activities. This 
fuels the expansion of military markets. Looking at intelligence by way of illustration, the growth in 
outsourcing has been exponential: 70% of the budget of US intelligence agencies was spent on 
contracting in 2007 and the amount (in dollars) spent on contracting had more than doubled 
between 2001 and 2006.
 
20
                                                 
16 Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything (London: Demos, 2004); Michael Power, Organized 
Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 It should also be recalled that risks—including military ones—concern 
17 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, 'The surveillant assemblage', British Journal of Sociology, 51 (2000), pp. 
605-622. 
18 Actant is a term is borrowed from Bruno Latour, Re-assembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor Network Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The idea of a boundary object is taken from Michael Power, Organized 
Uncertainty. 
19 Power, The Risk Management of Everything and Michael Power, 'The risk management of nothing', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 34 (2009), pp. 849-855. 
20 Tim Shorrok, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008): 
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not only states but also private companies, international and non-governmental organizations and 
individuals and that their demand also fuels market growth.  
From this perspective, the role of Blackwater in the CIA Killing Program could be expected; 
it stands as an example among many. The multiple, ill-defined risk scenarios that made the program 
appear necessary in the first place stand out as yet another illustration of the self-sustaining spread 
of risk technologies.21
 
 The surprise and outrage both the killing program and the role of 
Blackwatern in it provoked when they were revealed, confirms the degree to which the spread of 
risk thinking, the actions associated with them, including the creation of markets has a tendency to 
pass unnoted.  
c. Risk professionals and their strategies 
To locate the entire link between risk thinking and the expansion of apolitical military markets in 
anonymous risk discourses and unnoted spread of risk technologies would be to disregard the 
strategies of risk professionals, including academics. They have tended to promote the spread of 
risk thinking, of the markets associated with this spread as well as an apolitical understanding of 
this process.22
The growth of a professional corps of risk analysts, risk managers and risk scenario builders 
has accompanied the expansion and extension of risk analysis. This group of analysts has developed 
its own techniques, rules and standards and become increasingly differentiated and specialized. 
Hacking dates the institutionalization of the professional risk analysis to 1969 and that of risk 
management to 1995 (following Power’s analysis).
 
23 Professionals of risk work both in the public 
and the private, and often span the spheres. They think of their work as largely integrated. 24 A 
member of the US National Intelligence Council explained that non-state professionals had a central 
role in Intelligence. He underlined that the intelligence community referred to them as “intelligence 
community associates” rather than as commercial, private or non-state to reflect this closeness and 
to avoid the negative connotations of the term outsourcing.25
                                                                                                                                                                  
18-9. 
  
21 According to CIA officials: “the plans remained vague and were never carried” Zanetti and Shane, 'CIA had Plan’. 
22 Strategy is used in Bourdieuan fashion, as a reflection of the dispositions (taken for granted understanding and 
habitus) and positions (resources and strength at the disposal) of given actors. For further discussions and a contrast 
between the logic and the way most economic theories conceive of strategy see the introductory chapter in Pierre 
Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). 
23Hacking, 'Risk and Dirt'. 
24 For examples from intelligence specifically, the detailed discussion of Boz Allen Hamilton in Shorrok, Spies for Hire. 
25 Mathew Burrows (the chief drafter of the National Intelligence Council report Global Trends: The Word at 2025) at a  
the public conference ‘Around the Report "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World’ at the Danish Institute of 
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Risk professionals (public, private, hybrid) are prone to support and promote the spread of 
risk thinking and the related markets. One reason may be banal self-interest: risk professionals 
support an expansion of their own institutions, their profit, the status of their profession and so on. 
Avoiding politics makes this easier. But there are most certainly also more complex and interesting 
processes at play here. The world view of risk analysts/managers (as of any professional group) 
reflects their training and their professional context. They may therefore promote the expansion of 
an apolitical technical understanding of risk (and the markets attached to it) just as much out of 
conviction as out of self-interest. Risk management is an important technical, scientific expertise 
that is best kept aloof of politics. This is the opinion of Vedby Rasmusen who has worked on risk in 
international relations. He explains that risk-analysis cannot easily be integrated in politics because 
policy-makers tend to be too short-termist, result oriented and simplistic in their judgment to deal 
adequately with risk rationalities that are long term, without visible results (success is the non 
realization of risks) and complex to judge.26 Similarly, the many non-state “intelligence community 
associates” reportedly decline to charge for their services presumably do so because they believe in 
the significance of their contribution.27
 The CIA Killing Program illustrates the argument. When the program was re-launched 
after the brief interruption in 2004, it was done with a role for commercial actors, Blackwater 
specifically. This decision coincided with the move of Alvin Bernard Krongard—former third from 
the top at the CIA—to the company. It points to a professional cohesion that spans the public and 
private and a willingness/interest/persuasion of this profession to back up around a risk scenario 
justifying the program and the measures taken to respond to the preventive imperatives it created 
(including the outsourcing). Those involved in the program no doubt share Cheney’s assessment 
that it was “directly responsible for the fact that for eight years we had no further mass casualty 
attacks against the United States.”
 Whether articulated as self-interest or not, a steadily 
increasing number of risk professionals follow strategies spreading risk thinking and the associated 
apolitical markets.  
28 They probably also share senator Hoekstra understanding that 
outsourcing was therefore justified particularly since the contractors took on purely “mechanical” 
roles that did not require “a lot of judgment”.29
                                                                                                                                                                  
International Studies, Copenhagen 7 September 2009). 
 
26See Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty First Century.: 199-200. 
27 Burrows, ‘Around the Report’. 
28 Swarns, 'Cheney Offers Sharp Defense'. 
29 Quoted in Andrea Mitchell, 'MSNBC Interview with Representative Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) about CIA Subcontracting 
Assassination Program' (Federal News Service  21 August 2009). 
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To approach risk—and the contracting related to it—as merely technical is highly 
problematic. “The problems of risk perception [and one might add the outsourcing triggered by 
these] are essentially political. Congress and parliaments give away their rightful territory when 
they hand over such problems to risk experts. The public debates about risk are debates about 
politics”.30 This insight has failed to make its way. Even in the debate in the wake of Panetta’s 
revelations about the Killing Program critique of the risk scenarios that created the imperative to act 
and justified the reliance on Blackwater has been scarce.31
Unaccountable War-Makers 
 Discussion has focussed more on the 
question of how the regulation of companies (such as Blackwater) can be improved—including by 
delimiting “inherent state tasks” from which contractors should be barred. The link between 
markets and spiralling risk scenarios that create imperatives for action has been largely untouched. 
Yet, as will be argued in the next section, the narrow focus on improved regulation and 
accountability has the paradoxical consequence of entrenching the lack of accountability. 
The narrow conception of regulation and accountability tied to the difficulty of politicizing military 
markets has the effect of creating what I here term an accountability paradox whereby the quest for 
accountability and improved regulation is entrenching the fundamental lack of accountability of the 
markets. After a decade of what Kierpaul terms a “mad scramble” to bring contractors to justice, we 
still have very few cases where contractors have been convicted of anything.32 This is not for lack 
of information.33 Nor is the situation immobile. Rapid legal innovation is creating new instruments 
that will make it possible to try contractors and hence also to hold them accountable.34
                                                 
30 Mary Douglas, 'Muffled Ears', in Mary Douglas (ed.) Risk and Blame (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 
79. 
 However, as 
long as military markets remain apolitical, accountability is bound to remain limited. The key 
reason is that an apolitical view on markets renders critique of the enmeshment of the public and the 
31 Scarce leaves room for the commentators who have drawn attention to the problems and the issues involved more on 
which below. 
32 Ian Kierpaul, 'The Rush to Bring Private Military Contractors to Justice: The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, 
and Law Students after Abu Ghraib', The University of Toledo Law Review, 39 (2008), pp. 407-435. 
33 Reports abound both in the media, in law journals and by NGOs and IOs including the UN working group on 
mercenaries. For Iraq for example the NGO Human Rights first keeps a record of incidences Human Rights First, 
'Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity', in  (Washington: Human Rights First, 2008). 
34 For the US context the changes to the MEJA and the UCMJ as well as the possibility of using the Alien Tort Statue 
against contractor (currently tried out in Virginia against Blackwater employees involved in the Nisour incident) are 
significant changes. But they have yet to result in convictions. See Elizabeth K. Waits, 'Avoiding the 'Legal Bermuda 
Triangle': The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act's Unprecedented Expansion of U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Foreign Nationals', Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 23 (2008), pp. 493-540. 
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private unlikely and difficult.  
 
a. Accountability of Enmeshed Spheres 
The ties between the market and the public are often perceived as a key problem for any effort to 
ensure that markets are accountable. A common rendering of this issue is as one of “revolving 
doors”. However, the picture of a revolving door presupposes that people walk in and out and 
belong to distinct contexts. It fails to capture professional who belong to both the public and the 
private at the same time and work in partnership. An image of enmeshed professional spheres is 
more adequate. A quest for accountability that does not recognize this blurring is bound to 
encounter difficulties. 
 Accountability of military market actors is hampered by the strong links and networks 
between private and public security professionals. Private actors are often doing the “dirty jobs” 
states wish to dissociate themselves from.35 The other side of this coin has been that private market 
actors push their agenda onto the state. By lobbying officials or by creating faits accomplis they 
may change state positions on specific contracts but perhaps more generally foreign policy 
orientations.36 However, the image of the public harnessing the private and vice versa understates 
the accountability issues involved. The present situation is one where the private and public are 
interwoven: the private is inside the public and the public inside the private. The common adage in 
the private military market that “everyone is an ex-something” is a way of indicating this. Similarly, 
the emphasis on creating “private-public-partnerships” and more generally on public private 
collaboration underscores it. The resulting public-private enmeshment is pursued enthusiastically 
both by the private and the public side than; sometimes even more enthusiastically by the public.37
The consequence is practices that make the applicability of an accountability system based 
on a conventional understanding of the distinction between public and private elusive. Examples 
abound of situations where companies have acted as their own controllers, authors of their own 
contracts, definers of (uncontrollable) performance benchmarks, and even have charged payment 
for non-defined and undocumented work.
  
38
                                                 
35 Major Todd S. Milliard, 'Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military 
Companies', Military Law Review, (2003), pp. 1-95. 
 It is important to underscore that these practices have 
36 Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern 
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 59-63. 
37 Nicholas Dorn and Michael Levi, 'European Private Security, Corporate Investigation and Military Services: 
Collective Security, Market Regulation and Structuring the Public Sphere', Policing & Society, 17 (2007), pp. 213-238. 
38 GAO, 'DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements', in  (Washington: Government Accountability Office, 
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not taken place against the state but most often with the avail and full knowledge of the public 
officials involved. Markets are not taking over the state, the state is merging with markets and 
commercializing itself. The implication of the resulting enmeshed practices is that accountability 
based on regulations that presume a distinction between the public and the private become close nay 
impossible.  
The CIA Killing Program bears the marks of the enmeshment of public and private. The 
Program can of course be read in conventional terms as case of the state harnessing the private 
and/or the private the state. According a to retired intelligence officer “outsourcing gave the agency 
more protection in case something went wrong”39 and according to the Spiegel, Blackwater 
lobbying “created the program”.40 However, on a closer look the issue becomes more complex. 
Krongard was an insider both in Blackwater and in the CIA. The outsourcing was clearly treated 
more as dealings with “intelligence community associates”, to use Burrows’ expression, than as an 
outsourcing of a specific set of limited tasks of a public agency to a commercial one. This was not a 
contract for which bidders were sought. Rather it was a relationship (the details of which remain 
unclear) between professionals. As an expression of this, the “outsourcing” was not based written 
contracts, with a clearly formulated service to be rendered at a specified. Rather the so called 
contracting in the case of the CIA Killing Program was based on “individual agreements”.41
To hold companies accountable, the enmeshment of spheres that leads to the spread of this 
kind of practice cannot be seen as incidental or secondary. It has to be taken as a point of departure 
and placed in the centre of regulatory efforts if accountability is not to remain an empty word and 
effective regulation an unattainable goal.  
 There 
are therefore bound to be few—if any—traces of the activities undertaken by Blackwater under the 
program or of the $20 million paid for these. Holding the company and/or the involved CIA 
officials accountable is consequently a real challenge. The interaction has taken place on terms that 
differ radically from those presupposed by the law. 
 
b. The “blindspot” of legislation 
Placing the enmeshment of the public and private at the centre of the quest for accountability is 
however not easily done. The reason is that modern legal systems operate on the assumption that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2008); GAO, 'Intelligence Reform: GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management 
Reform Initiatives', in  (Washington D.C.: GAO, 2008). 
39 Quoted in Warrick and Smith, 'CIA Hired Firm for Assassin Program'. 
40 Der Spiegel, 'Blackwater accused of creating 'Killing Program''. 
41 Mazzetti, 'CIA Sought Blackwater's Help'. 
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the spheres are separable. The pursuit of improved regulation and accountability logically draws on 
the existing body of law. In so doing it perpetuates the difficulty of directing attention to the 
problem of enmeshed spheres. 
The modern legal system built on the assumption that there are clearly separated spheres to 
specific bodies of law apply and that these bodies of law are themselves strictly separated and 
hierarchically related to each other. Multinational corporations for example span the inside/outside 
distinction on which international law rests, are effectively made “legally invisible” by the 
“analytical and theoretical foundations of international law”.42 This image can be complicated by 
taking the so called “fragmentation” of law that has undermined hierarchy and unity into account.43 
This opens the possibility of shifting legal logics. If multinational corporations cannot be seen in 
international law they can perhaps be seen in the lex mercatoria or in other private international 
regimes.44 Whether singular or fragmented, the legal system(s) makes processes, actors and issues 
that violate the distinctions on which it/they are built “invisible”. This “blindness”—the existence of 
“blind spots”—is in no way unique to the legal system and is the precondition for it to be 
functional. Distinctions are necessary. The eye that sees everything ultimately sees nothing.45
This sheds light on the difficulty of placing the enmeshment of spheres at the heart of the 
efforts to improve accountability and regulation (and hence also on its relative ineffectiveness). The 
key accountability efforts have had the dual objective of holding military market actors accountable 
to existing law and of making sure that these laws are adapted “to restore consistency between the 
letter of the [existing] law and its spirit” where it has been lost.
 
However, the implication is that the legal system(s) cannot be used to regulate problems, issues and 
occurrences in their own blind spot. 
46
                                                 
42 Claire Cutler, 'Transnational Business Civilization, Corporations, and the Privatization of Global Governance', in 
Christopher May (ed.) Global Corporate Power (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 199-226.: 202. 
 The bodies of law most commonly 
discussed are international human rights law, national legislations (on contracting, on military 
services), military law, and a range of soft laws (including relevant code of conducts). The 
hindrance to focusing on the problem of enmeshment is that precisely the public/private boundary is 
a distinction which is defining for modern legal systems; it is a division used to categorize actors 
43 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, 'Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law', Michigan Journal of International Law, 25 (2004), pp. 999-1045. 
44 Claire A. Cutler, 'Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation', in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. 
Bierstecker (eds.) The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 23-40; Gunther Teubner, 'Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of 
Autonomous Sectors in World Society', in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed.) Globalization and Public Governance (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004), pp. 71-88. 
45 Teubner, 'In the Blind Spot': 59. 
46 James R. Coleman, 'Constraining Modern Mercenarism', Hastings Law Journal, 55 (2004), pp. 1493-1537.: 1494. 
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and to separate spheres. It is their blind spot which they cannot see and not be used to address. This 
is not the same as saying that they are useless in general or that no accountability/ regulation can be 
constructed on them; on the contrary.  
What cannot be done is to use them to address the problem of enmeshment or to integrate 
enmeshment within them. This would take the development of legal systems not assuming away the 
enmeshment from the outset. But that in turn is linked to a willingness to accept that there are 
incompatible legal principles at work; it implies giving up on legal unity, hierarchy and 
perfection.47 It presupposes a willingness to shift out of legal language, identifying enmeshment as 
a key issue and politicize the market. Not only the preventive imperative but also the professional 
“strategies” of security professionals, lawyers, journalists and policy-makers militate against this. 
The legal system is the legitimate, state sanctioned, language for discussing accountability and 
regulation.48
The CIA Killing program—and the role of Blackwater in it—is a good case in point. 
Accountability and regulation has been thought mainly in terms of whether or not these were in 
conformity with existing laws and regulations in place. For example, questions were raised about 
whether or not the program and Blackwater’s role in it violated national legislations and particularly 
the 1976 executive order banning assassinations [following plots against Patrice Lumumba and 
Fidel Castro],
 
49 about whether or not the targeted associations were in conformity with international 
law50, or about whether or not the failure to notify congress about the program violated the 
regulations about intelligence work.51 Aattorney general Holden leading the inquiry set up to 
investigate the Killing Program was careful and explicitly to underline that it would “target only 
those who acted beyond legal guidelines”.52
                                                 
47 For a general argument to this effect Gunther Teubner, 'Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centered 
Constitutional Theory', in Christian Joergs, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds.) Constitutionalism and 
Transnational Governance (Oxford: Hart, 2004), pp. 31-50; Teubner, 'Global Private Regimes'. 
 Mirroring this, the defence of the program and the way 
it has been outsourced and remained unreported rested on references to conformity with the laws in 
vigour. Hence, those justifying that program and the role of outsourcing insisted that the ban on 
targeted assassinations did not concern terrorists; that killing a terrorist is equivalent to killing an 
48 For the significance of institutional state sanctioning in the legal field see Pierre Bourdieu, 'Rethinking the State: On 
the Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field', Sociological Theory, 12 (1994), pp. 1-19. 
49 Zanetti and Shane, 'CIA had Plan to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders'. 
50 Mazzetti, 'CIA Sought Blackwater's Help'. 
51 Landler and Mazzetti, 'US Still Using Security Firm'. 
52 The Economist, 'CIA Interrogations and the Blackwater affair'; Josh Meyer, 'CIA Inquiry will Target Contractors', 
Los Angeles Times, 28 August 2009. 
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enemy in battle (and hence not illegal); that Congress had given its avail; that outsourcing did not 
involve inherent state functions etc.  
This discussion is important. Some accountability is better than none. The point here is that 
pursuit of this kind of accountability is unlikely to get at the vexed issue of how to deal with 
enmeshment. Yet, since enmeshment is the Gordian knot of improved accountability in military 
markets the pursuit of accountability is likely to remain limited. Cutting that Gordian knot would 
require a thorough politicization of military markets and the way they have been integrated inside 
the state, including in intelligence work. However, as has just been argued the legal framing of the 
quest for accountability makes such a politicization move unlikely since enmeshment is in the 
“blind spot” of law. 
 
c. The Accountability Paradox  
More strongly, if we displace our attention from the effectiveness of the quest for improved 
accountability to what that quest itself does, we run into something I am terming an accountability 
paradox. The point is that not only is the quest for improved accountability/regulation likely to 
remain rather ineffectual more than this (and hence the paradox) it may weaken accountability 
further. 
 The reason is that the pursuit of accountability itself triggers two kinds of processes 
that hamper the politicization of markets necessary for a development of more effective legal 
mechanisms directed specifically at enmeshment. The first process is of the familiar “crowding out” 
type. Framing discussions about improved accountability in terms of the existing system is a way of 
concentrating energy, attention and imagination on how to supplement or reform the existing 
legislation. Legal scholars, lawyers, journalists and policy-makers devote their time and energy to 
speaking and thinking within this frame. A mastery of (or better a pretense to master) relevant legal 
terminology becomes a sine qua non for participation. The flip side of this is to marginalize 
attention to alternative possibilities that might put the public/private divide in the centre as opposed 
to in the blind spot. But perhaps even more damaging, it tends to reduce attention (and critique) of 
the enmeshment itself. By framing the discussion in terms of existing laws observers are constantly 
lead to argue as if there was a real existing public/private divide and ignore the extent to which this 
is a legal fiction. This is an obstacle innovative imagination and of critical thinking. It amounts to a 
marginalization that is all the more effective as it rests on and transmits all the symbolic power (and 
violence) of established law and of professionals of accountability and regulation.  
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The second process set in motion by the quest for accountability is one of reinforcing and 
bolstering of the existing system. The process of accountability itself, leads to intense legal 
innovation that creates an increased number of instruments that can be use to address a range of 
issues in military markets. This has a reassuring effect: the issues can be dealt with. There is a 
legal/regulatory apparatus for the purpose. More than this, the process generates a new category of 
experts and expertise that have a vested interest in and conviction about the effectiveness of this 
system. The reinsurance might even be bolstered by some successful court cases. The overall 
consequence then of the pursuit of accountability/regulation is that existing regulatory assemblages 
are further entrenched and reinforced, not challenged. But in the process enmeshments and blind-
spots are erased from the picture with the consequence that the prospects of better 
accountability/regulation are worsened; not improved.  
 Blackwater’s presence in the CIA Killing program can be used to anchor also this 
point. One of the reasons the outrage around the role of outsourcing in this program has been so 
strong is precisely that the company it was outsourced to is Blackwater. Blackwater (now Xe) is one 
of the most controversial firms in the military market. In addition to its violence against civilians 
(epitomized by the 2007 Nisour Square incident53), Blackwater has been in the limelight for its 
treatment of employees,54 for its dealings with clients,55 for its relationship with the armed forces 
and the intelligence56, for its corporate culture and for its controversial leader—Eric Prince. The 
consequence has been a string of investigations, court cases, and ultimately a public pledge on the 
part of the US State Department that it would no longer collaborate with the company. In spite of 
this, we not only find the company involved in the CIA Killing program. It also turns out that there 
are contractual arrangements running forward in time (at least until 2011) and that many officials 
see “few alternatives to Blackwater” for specified tasks.57
                                                 
53 See Peter W. Singer, 'Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go to War without 'Em: Private Military Contractors and 
Counterinsurgency', Foreign Policy at Brookings. Policy Papers, (2007) and Heather Carney, 'Prosecuting the Lawless: 
Human Rights Abuses and Private Military Firms', The George Washington Law Review, 74 (2006), pp. 317-342. 
 This context and the specificity of 
Blackwater raises the question how the company and its employees can enjoy such impunity? They 
have been in the legal limelight like no other military market actor. The company fills a scapegoat 
54 For example the Fallujah lynching where four Blackwater employees were killed has triggered court cases by the 
families of the employees in question. 
55 It has been investigated for overcharging and not respecting its engagements for example in relation to a plane 
incident in Afghanistan killing six people including three soldiers. 
56 It has been involved in several violent incidents of blue on white violence (military against contractors accidental or 
not). 
57 Neil Jr. King and August Cole, 'Few Alternatives to Blackwater', Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2007; Landler and 
Mazzetti, 'US Still Using Security Firm'; Ruben Navarette Jr., 'How will liberals react to Obama maintaining Bush-era 
security policies?' San Diego Union-Tribune, 28 August 2009. 
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function for the entire private security industry in the US.58 It is widely perceived as “enmeshed” in 
the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department. 59 Yet, the efforts mount legal cases against 
Blackwater have not only been singularly ineffective, they have crowded out the more general 
discussion about how enmeshment beyond the Blackwater case might be handled.60
More than this, the consequences of the many inquiries and court cases against Blackwater 
will probably perpetuate the lack of focus on enmeshment. The process will produce new regulatory 
instruments. It will make an increasing number of people who understand regulations in terms of 
these grow. Not only regulators, law enforces, but also policy-makers, journalists, advocacy groups 
and the rapidly growing industry consulting companies on regulation will integrate these measure 
into their arguments and thinking and hence entrench them further, increasing their centrality. 
Eventually Blackwater (Xe) may be convicted of something and/or be so damaged by the attention 
it attracts that it has to close and/or radically reform. This will then most probably be interpreted as 
confirming that the “culture of impunity” in private military markets is ending. We can remove the 
“bad eggs from the basket” and have accountable military markets grounded in existing regulatory 
systems. However, this conclusion may be misleading. Blackwater’s record is tainted record but 
there is little reason to suppose that other companies are better.
  
61
An “accountability paradox” is in other words a likely outcome of the present efforts to 
legal hold Blackwater and/or the CIA responsible for outsourcing in the frame of the CIA Killing 
Programs. The legal framing of the discussion and paradoxically even more so any success that it 
might have is likely to crowd out innovation and critique and perpetuate/entrench the blind spots 
and defects of the current legal/regulations system. 
 The most probable consequence of 
removing/marginalizing Blackwater will be a displacement of contracts to equivalent companies 
about which fewer questions are asked. At the same time success regulatory success will certainly 
heighten confidence in the present regulatory/accountability system and decrease the urgency of 
considering ways of improving it.  
                                                 
58 Ted Rall, 'Scapegoating Blackwater', Boise Weekly (Idaho), 17 October 2007; Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise 
of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (Washington: Nation Books, 2007). 
59 Epitomizing this is the civil lawsuit is filed against Blackwater for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) violations Jason Leopold, 'Feinstein: CIA Assassination Program Went Beyond the Simple Planning Stage', 
The Public Record, 21 August 2009. 
60 It is perhaps telling that representative Jan Schakowski who has worked on privatization of security for a long time 
driven originally by an interest in contracts role in Latin America, is now on the intelligence committee, and has tried to 
introduce the Stop Outsourcing Security, SOS, Act, H.R. 4102 (see 'Stop Outsourcing Security, or SOS, Act, HR4102' 
at www.janschakowsky.org/) is at the margins of the discussion around the CIA Killing Program. She was given 1 
minute to address the house of representatives on 16 Sept. 
61 On the contrary as argued e.g. by Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules: In the Company of America's Mercenaries Fighting 
in Iraq (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2008). 
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Conclusion 
To break out the accountability paradox it is important to politicize military markets; that is not 
merely to have a public debate and outrage over the latest scandal—such as Blackwater’s 
involvement in the CIA Killing Program—case but to have a public debate about the politics of 
military markets and particularly about the public/private enmeshment that it has created. This 
politicization is hampered by the (Bourdieuian) professional “strategies” of security professionals, 
lawyers, but also of journalists, academics, NGO activists and policy-makers who frame the 
accountability/regulation in legal terms. More than this, politicization is hindered by the “preventive 
imperative” created by risk thinking which frames the creation of markets as a technical necessity. 
This said, even if politicization of military markets and accountability of market actors are far from 
easily attainable they are not impossible. Both in politics and in civil society attempts have been 
made to politicize.62 Drawing critical attention to the reasons why it is so difficult (as this article has 
attempted to do) is to participate in a reflexive process that might eventually make it easier.63
This article has highlighted the centrality of the preventive imperative tied to risk thinking 
in de-politicizing markets it has linked this de-politicization to the impunity of markets by insisting 
that accountability requires politicization. The question is how general this argument is. Drawing on 
the CIA Killing program and outsourcing to Blackwater to illustrate claims and arguments has 
given the article a strongly US American flavor. However, the intent has been to highlight some 
general processes and mechanisms linked to risk thinking and the creation of apolitical 
unaccountable military markets. The contention is that these processes and mechanisms are more 
general and of relevance beyond the US American context, the CIA Killing Program and 
Blackwater with the important caveat that the way that they play out varies by context.
 
64
                                                 
62 See for example fn 
 Even more 
strongly, processes of depoliticizing military markets and creating unaccountable market actors are 
relevant to International Studies. They are processes moving the legal and political boundaries in 
the discipline. The disciplinary implication of the argument here is that the use of force increasingly 
is situated outside boundaries of the political and legal processes assumed to embed and regulate it. 
60 and the civil society groups militating against commercial military services such as 
www.blackwaterwatch.net or www.stopblackwater.net . 
63 As clear from the references above, this article is far from the only one reflecting on this. 
64 Europeans are far closer to the US logic than they usually think, but so are many other countries because technologies 
of government (in this case risk thinking and law) may be given a contextual content and structure but they also span 
borders as do the professional communities that implement them. Making this argument in detail is far beyond the scope 
of this article but see e.g. Marieke De Goede, 'Beyond Risk: Premeditation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination', 
Security Dialogue, 39 (2008), pp. 155-176; Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds.) Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: 
Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes (New York and London: Routledge, 2008); and Didier Bigo, Laurent Bonelli, 
Dario Chi and Christian Olsson, Mapping of the Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007). 
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Therefore, not only do we need to revise the way we think about it in international studies 
incorporating commercial actors; we also need to focus on the enmeshment of the commercial and 
the public—not to say the commercialization of the public—and its political implications.  
 
